How can the negative effects of partisan polarization on democratic attitudes be mitigated? Can polarized individuals be persuaded to choose democracy over party, i.e., support a candidate from an opposing party who upholds democratic norms when their co-partisan candidate fails to do so? We tested the effect of an online civic education intervention conducted on over 41,000 individuals in 33 countries that was designed to promote the choice for “democracy” by emphasizing the benefits of democratic versus autocratic regimes. The results are striking: exposure to civic education messages significantly dampens the negative effect of partisan polarization on anti-democratic co-partisan candidate choice. Civic education also has a small positive effect on polarization itself, with further exploration showing that this is the result of increased evaluations of parties that uphold democratic norms and practices, resulting in greater differences between democratic and antidemocratic parties.

How extensive and intense is out-party hostility in contemporary multiparty democracies, and what are its consequences for democratic attitudes, political engagement, and voting behavior? While previous studies have highlighted increasing trends in such hostility, existing measures of the concept fall short in three key respects: they fail to account for the breadth and intensity of hostility in multiparty systems, they do not offer a singular measure for overall hostility, and they do not account for the relative prevalence of negative versus positive party affect. This paper introduces a new measure, ‘Relative Hostility’ to overcome these limitations. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) across 48 multiparty democracies, this study compares the effects of ‘Relative Hostility’ with those of existing measures of out-party hostility and Affective Polarization on democratic attitudes, support for extremism, and political participation. The findings demonstrate that ‘Relative Hostility’ more accurately explains the adverse effects on democracies, such as increased dissatisfaction with democracy and support for extremist parties. These findings underscore the urgent need for developing strategies that mitigate out-party hostility to bolster democratic resilience.

While recent research on polarization has highlighted a “democratic divide” in reactions to anti-democratic actors, less is known about hostility within democratic blocs themselves. Intense hostility between supporters of democratic parties often leaves democratic blocs internally divided. As a result, an urgent challenge in Europe’s multiparty democracies is how to sustain support among pro-democratic actors as anti-democratic parties continue to rise. Can pro-democracy messaging reduce such hostility and improve democratic commitments and behavior within this bloc? This study addresses these questions using a preregistered online survey experiment conducted in Germany in advance of the 2025 federal election. Respondents were exposed to hypothetical social media messages on X that either emphasized inter-party dialogue and tolerance or highlighted the dangers posed by an anti-democratic challenger. The results reveal a clear asymmetry: messages emphasizing a democratic threat produce larger and more consistent improvements in intra-democratic party affect and behavior toward democratic outparties. These findings suggest that threat-based pro-democracy framing is more effective than norm-based appeals for shaping democratic attitudes in divided multiparty contexts.

Out-party hostility is widely seen as a threat to democratic stability, yet little is known about whether its consequences are equally damaging across partisan groups. We argue that hostility becomes particularly consequential among supporters of populist radical right (PRR) parties, whose rhetoric frames political conflict in moralized and antagonistic terms, lowering the threshold for tolerating anti-democratic behavior. Using experimental data from Spain, we show that out-party hostility is more strongly associated with anti-democratic attitudes among PRR (VOX) supporters than among other voters. Cross-national CSES evidence from five Western European countries offers suggestive support. We then test whether these effects can be mitigated through a civic education experiment in Spain. Brief online civic education interventions, particularly those emphasizing democratic rights and institutional constraints, sharply reduce these effects. The findings identify PRR support as a key condition under which hostility becomes democratically corrosive and demonstrate that targeted civic education can mitigate these risks.

An acute challenge in today’s American democracy is designing strategies that strengthen citizens’ readiness to reject undemocratic candidates, all while navigating an information environment that relentlessly competes for their attention. To date, a common approach among political actors and civic organizations has been to design and disseminate short advertisements that promote democratic values. Yet we lack empirical evidence on whether such campaigns actually increase voters’ willingness to prioritize democracy over partisan loyalty during elections—leaving the central question unresolved: Can democracy be advertised in the United States? We outline five theoretical dimensions along which democracy advertisements can vary, and systematically select, edit, and test 50 ads produced by Lincoln Project—a pro-democracy organization that has invested millions of dollars in more than 1000 democracy-promoting ads over the past five years. Utilizing an original, pre-registered, and well-powered survey experiment with over 10,000 U.S. respondents, we find that the most frequently used type of democracy advertisement—negative ads emphasizing the dangers and consequences of democratic erosion—fails to strengthen citizens’ willingness to prioritize democracy over partisan loyalty. In contrast, the rarest type—emotionally hopeful ads celebrating the everyday benefits of democratic life—proves highly effective. Timely and innovative, these findings advance our knowledge on strengthening democratic commitment in an age of fleeting attention and redefine how we think about pro-democratic interventions in the 21st-century information environment.

An urgent challenge in today’s democratic landscape is how to counter the rising influence of authoritarian rhetoric. While prior research documents the persuasive power of these appeals, we lack causal evidence on how to push back. This study provides the first direct test of whether, and how, pro-democracy messages can blunt the effects of authoritarian messaging. Using an online survey experiment with 4,000 U.S. respondents, we systematically vary exposure to authoritarian and pro-democracy narratives. We compare two common democratic frames, freedom-based and outcome-based appeals, and evaluate their effectiveness both on their own and as counters to authoritarian messages. The findings offer timely insight into how democratic values can be defended through clearer, more effective communication in an era of rising autocratic influence.